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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII

DANNY GALLAGHER,

CIV. NO. 18-00364 LEK-KJM

Plaintiff,
vs.
MATERNITYWISE INTERNATIONAL,
LLC, ANNE CROUDACE, ELIZBETH
ANOATUBBY, EMILEE SALDAYA,
RACHAEL BROWN, JENNA CHIDESTER,
STEPHANIE GILBERT, JORDAN ASHLEY
HOCKER, BETHANY KIRILLOVA,
SAMANTHA LAJOIE, AERIN LUND,
KATE PAVLOVSKY, CHANNA JAYDE
WALZ, MADDISON WEIKLE, ESME
WHRITENOUR, NICOLETTE RAYMOND,
ELIZABETH GEFTAKYS, JULIE BELL,
CARA GWIZD, HOLLY LEPPARDWESTHAVER, ELOISE VICTORIA,
JANE DOE ONE, JANE DOE TWO,
JANE DOE THREE, DOES 1-10,
INCLUSIVE;
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART:
1) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL;
2) DEFENDANT LUND’S JOINDER; AND 3) DEFENDANT SALDAYA’S JOINDER
On December 14, 2018, Specially Appearing Defendants
MaternityWise International, LLC (“MaternityWise”), Christy Anne
Croudace (“Croudace”), Jane Hopaki (“Hopaki”), Stephanie Byers
(“Byers”), Bethany Ellen Kirillov (“Kirillov”), Kate Pavlovsky
(“Pavlovsky”), and Madison Sisley Boulter (“Boulter” and
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collectively “MaternityWise Defendants”),1 filed their Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial (“Motion”).

[Dkt. no. 49.]

On

December 19, 2018, Specially Appearing Defendant Aerin Lund
(“Lund”) filed her joinder of simple agreement to the Motion,
and on December 28, 2018, Specially Appearing Defendant Emilee
Saldaya (“Saldaya”) filed her joinder of simple agreement to the
Motion (“the Joinders”).

[Dkt. nos. 52, 55.]

Plaintiff Danny

Gallagher (“Plaintiff”) filed his memorandum in opposition on
January 4, 2019, and the MaternityWise Defendants filed their
reply on January 11, 2018.2

[Dkt. nos. 57, 60.]

came on for hearing on January 25, 2019.

These matters

The MaternityWise

Defendants’ Motion and the Joinders are hereby granted in part
and denied in part as this Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over the parties other than MaternityWise,
Croudace, and Boulter.

The dismissal is without prejudice and

Plaintiff has leave to amend.

1

Plaintiff identifies Hopaki as “Elizbeth Anoatubby,”
[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 6,] Byers as “Stephanie Gilbert,”
[id. at ¶ 10,] and Boulter as “Maddison Weikle,” [id. at ¶ 17].
2

The MaternityWise Defendants later submitted a Notice of
Errata to Specially Appearing Defendants’ Reply in Support of
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on
January 14, 2019. [Dkt. no. 61.]
2
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The instant action involves various claims, including
those for defamation, as a result of comments about Plaintiff
which were made on social media; specifically Facebook.

Due to

the global reach of this popular social networking website,
individuals sued in this matter apparently reside in various
places throughout the United States as well as other countries.
At the heart of the Motion is this issue: where the acts alleged
as the basis for the cause of actions occurred in cyberspace,
can personal jurisdiction ever exist?
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on
September 25, 2018 based on diversity jurisdiction.
no. 1.]

[Dkt.

The operative pleading relevant to the issues at hand

is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand
for Jury Trial (“Second Amended Complaint”) filed on October 4,
2018, in which the defendants are the MaternityWise Defendants,
Saldaya, Lund, Rachel Brown (“Brown”), Jenna Chidester
(“Chidester”), Jordan Ashley Hocker (“Hocker”), Samantha Lajoie
(“Lajoie”), Channa Jayde Walz (“Walz”), Esme Whritenour
(“Whritenour”), Nicolette Raymond (“Raymond”), Elizabeth
Geftakys (“Geftakys”), Julie Bell (“Bell”), Cara Gwizd
(“Gwizd”), Holly Leppard-Westhaver (“Leppard-Westhaver”), Eloise

3
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[Dkt.

no. 33.]
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
is a resident of the State of Hawai`i, and MaternityWise is a
limited liability company that “acquir[ed] its charter under the
laws” of New York, with its principal place of business in
Texas.

[Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.]

Croudace is a citizen of Texas, and is

the principal of MaternityWise.

[Id. at ¶¶ 5, 36.]

Plaintiff

alleges all other named defendants are not citizens of the State
of Hawai`i, and some are not citizens of the United States.
[Id. at pgs. 3-5.]

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s claims is that

Defendants have all made defamatory statements about Plaintiff
via social media, which have gone “viral.”
he has been irreparably harmed.

[Id.]

As a result,

[Id. at ¶ 33.]

The allegations pertinent to the Motion at hand are that:
MaternityWise provides a doula training and certification
program in exchange for a fee; Croudace is certified through
MaternityWise to train prospective doulas; Croudace and
MaternityWise use Facebook and various social media discussion

3

Plaintiff also identifies Brown as “Rachael Phoenix” and
Geftakys as “Becca Russell.” [Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 8,
20.] Plaintiff later dismissed all of his claims without
prejudice against Hocker on November 30, 2018, and on
December 13, 2018, Plaintiff dismissed all of his claims without
prejudice against Geftakys. [Dkt. nos. 40, 48.]
4
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groups to market the MaternityWise program to every state and
country - including the State of Hawai`i - to find both clients
and students; some of the doula training workshops are marketed
towards, and held in Hawai`i; and Plaintiff obtained his doula
certification through a MaternityWise training workshop held in
Hawai`i.

[Id. at ¶¶ 34, 39, 40-42.]
As to the alleged defamation, Plaintiff’s claims

center on two sources of defamation – first, a “Memorandum of
Official Statement” dated June 5, 2018 (“MaternityWise
Memorandum”) sent by Croudace, in which Plaintiff was accused of
violating the ethical and professional standards of his
profession as a photographer and doula; and, second, comments
posted on Plaintiff’s Facebook page, in which he is accused of
rape, attempted murder, sexual exploitation, prostitution,
“pimping,” and/or sexual harassment.

[Id. at ¶ 120.]

In the Motion, the MaternityWise Defendants seek
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to properly
serve the Second Amended Complaint upon the MaternityWise
Defendants but do not specify whether dismissal should be made
with or without prejudice.

5
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DISCUSSION
I.

Personal Jurisdiction
In considering a motion brought under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court has
stated:
A plaintiff has the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. See Love v. Associated Newspapers,
Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608 (9th Cir. 2010);
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d
797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff must
establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant
with respect to each claim. Action Embroidery
Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174,
1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Personal jurisdiction must
exist for each claim asserted against a
defendant.” (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.
Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir.
1977))).
When, as here, a district court acts on a
motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary
hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the
motion to dismiss. Love, 611 F.3d at 608;
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. Although a
plaintiff may not simply rest on the bare
allegations of the complaint, uncontroverted
allegations in the complaint must be taken as
true, and conflicts between parties over
statements contained in affidavits or
declarations must be resolved in the plaintiff’s
favor. See Love, 611 F.3d at 608;
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800.
Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1076 (D. Hawai`i
2014) (some citations omitted).
The district court considers two factors
before exercising personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in a diversity of
6
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citizenship case: “(1) whether an applicable
state rule or statute potentially confers
jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) whether
assertion of such jurisdiction accords with
constitutional principles of due process.” Flynt
Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1984). “The jurisdictional inquiries under
state law and federal due process merge into one
analysis” when, as here, the state’s long-arm
statute is “coextensive with federal due process
requirements.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d
617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991). See Cowan v. First
Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 61 Haw. 644, 649, 608 P.2d
394, 399 (1980) (Hawaii’s long-arm statute, Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 634-35, was adopted to expand the
jurisdiction of Hawaii’s courts to the extent
permitted by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). . . .
The Due Process Clause protects a person’s
“liberty interest in not being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has
established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or
relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). The
Due Process Clause requires that defendants have
“certain minimum contacts with [Hawaii] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Data
Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557
F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977). The minimum
contacts required mean that the defendant must
have purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the foreign
jurisdiction, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of the foreign jurisdiction’s laws.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Court of Cal.,
480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987). In applying Due
Process Clause requirements, courts have created
two jurisdictional concepts—general and specific
jurisdiction.
A court may exercise general jurisdiction
over the defendant when the defendant is a
resident or domiciliary of the forum state, or
7
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the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are
continuous, systematic, and substantial.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 [104 S. Ct. 1868, 80
L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984)]; Data Disc, 557 F.2d at
1287. . . .
. . . .
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand,
may be found when the cause of action arises out
of the defendant’s contact or activities in the
forum state. See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942
F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991); Data Disc, 557
F.2d at 1287. . . .
Id. at 1077-78 (some alterations in Barranco) (some citations
omitted).

Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Court

has personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants.

See Rush

v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (“The requirements of
International Shoe, however, must be met as to each defendant
over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.”).
A.

General Jurisdiction
“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile;
for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”

Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)
(citation omitted).

Plaintiff argues this Court has general

jurisdiction over MaternityWise and Croudace because they
conduct business, advertise, and hold trainings in Hawai`i, and
are thus essentially present in the forum.
8

[Mem. in Opp. at 7;
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The MaternityWise

Defendants argue MaternityWise’s certification trainings occur
in Hawai`i approximately once a year, and the last training held
in Hawai`i was conducted from April 25 to April 28, 2018.
[Reply, Decl. Kevin A. Yolken (“Yolken Decl.”), at ¶ 6.4]
Although MaternityWise conducts some of its trainings
in the forum and advertises its workshops in Hawai`i, Plaintiff
has not shown that general jurisdiction exists.

First,

Plaintiff alleges MaternityWise advertises its business to
“residents of every state and country,” in addition to Hawai`i.
[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 39.]

Second, Plaintiff’s Exhibit

15 demonstrates that MaternityWise offers doula training not
only in Hawai`i, but also Illinois, Florida, California,
Minnesota, Maryland, South Carolina, Atlanta, Texas, and New
York, [Decl. of Danny Gallagher in supp. of mem. in opp.
(“Gallagher Decl.”), filed 1/4/19 (dkt. no. 58), Exh. 15
(screenshot of www.maternitywise.com),] and appears to permit
website users to “request more doula trainings” for the rest of
the United States, including Washington D.C. and the Virgin
Islands.

[Gallagher Decl., Exh. 18 (screenshot of

www.maternitywise.com/doulatrainingdates).]

4

It can hardly be

Kevin A. Yolken is one of the attorneys retained to
specially represent the MaternityWise Defendants in this matter.
[Yolken Decl. at ¶ 2.]
(. . . continued)
9
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said that MaternityWise is “at home” in Hawai`i, when it
conducts business and advertises its workshops across the United
States.5

See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014)

(“General jurisdiction [] calls for an appraisal of a
corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and
worldwide.

A corporation that operates in many places can

scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”); see also Goodyear,
564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear
any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.” (quoting International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).

Accordingly, the Court finds that it

does not have general jurisdiction over MaternityWise.
With regard to Croudace, the primary focus is her
domicile.

See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.

Plaintiff alleges

Croudace is domiciled in, and is a citizen of Texas, see Second
Amended Complaint at ¶ 5, while the MaternityWise Defendants
assert Croudace resides in New York.
Decl. at ¶ 3.

See Reply at 5; Yolken

In any case, neither assertion indicates that

5

Exhibit 18 offers a link titled “Outside of the USA, Click
Here” on its Labor Doula Training Workshops & Postpartum Doula
Training and Certification page, suggesting MaternityWise also
advertises to consumers beyond the United States. [Gallagher
Decl., Exh. 18 at pg. 7 (emphasis in original).]
10
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Croudace is domiciled in Hawai`i, therefore the Court finds
general jurisdiction over Croudace is not appropriate in
Hawai`i.
B.

Specific Jurisdiction
In the alternative, Plaintiff argues this Court has

specific jurisdiction over all Defendants.

The Ninth Circuit

applies the following three-part test to determine whether
personal jurisdiction exists:
(1) The non-resident defendant must
purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum
or resident thereof; or perform some act by
which he purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out
of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with fair play and substantial
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.
1987). The plaintiff bears the burden of
satisfying the first two prongs of the test.
Sher [v. Johnson], 911 F.2d [1357,] 1361 [(9th
Cir. 1990)]. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy
either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is
not established in the forum state. If the
plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the
first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to “present a compelling case” that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
476–78, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985). . . .
11
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With regard to the first prong

of the specific jurisdiction test, the Ninth Circuit generally
looks to a party’s “purposeful direction” for actions sounding
in tort, and “purposeful availment” for actions sounding in
contract.

See id. at 802-03.

In evaluating purposeful

direction, the Ninth Circuit uses a three-part “effects” test
derived from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).6

See Dole Food Co. v.

Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).

“[T]he Calder

‘effects’ test requires that the defendant allegedly have
(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the
forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely
to be suffered in the forum state.”
1.

Id. (citations omitted).

Purposeful Direction
a.

MaternityWise and Croudace

Although Plaintiff’s allegations that MaternityWise
and Croudace conduct business in Hawai`i failed to establish
general jurisdiction, the Court finds the same factual
allegations are enough to establish specific personal
jurisdiction.

See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et

6

In Calder, the Supreme Court held that the California
court could exercise jurisdiction over two Florida newspapermen
who “expressly aimed” their conduct in Florida to allegedly
cause injuries to a resident in California. 465 U.S. at 783,
789.
12
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L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[The
first prong] may be satisfied by purposeful availment of the
privilege of doing business in the forum; by purposeful
direction of activities at the forum; or by some combination
thereof.”).

Because Plaintiff alleges MaternityWise and

Croudace marketed and held doula trainings and workshops in
Hawai`i, and Plaintiff was certified through one of their
Hawai`i training workshops, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts
to show MaternityWise and Croudace purposefully directed their
activities at the forum, to meet the first prong of the specific
jurisdiction test.
b.

Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and Pavlovksy

As to Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and Pavlovksy, the
Court has carefully examined Plaintiff’s allegations and the
evidence as to each defendant to determine whether any grounds
for specific personal jurisdiction may exist.

None of the

parties dispute that the acts alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint were intentional.

The dispositive issue here is

whether the defendants “expressly aimed” their injurious conduct
at Plaintiff, such that they knew harm would be suffered in
Hawai`i.

See id.

Plaintiff argues all Defendants directed

13
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their defamatory statements toward his Facebook business pages,7
which promoted his doula and photography work in Hawai`i,
thereby purposefully directing their conduct at the forum.
Plaintiff also submitted screenshots of the comments on his
Danny the Doula business page, and his Maternity in Motion
business page to show that his primary business location and his
residence in Hawai`i were readily apparent.

See Gallagher Decl.

at ¶¶ 7-10, Exh. 1 (screenshot of Danny the Doula Facebook
business page “Reviews” tab, Exh. 2 (screenshot of Maternity in
Motion Facebook business page).

Plaintiff asserts his Danny the

Doula page was linked to his Maternity in Motion page, and the
Maternity in Motion page clearly displayed photography and
videography taken in Hawai`i.

[Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10.]

Plaintiff

states both pages are meant to have the “feel of Hawaii,” based
on the Hawaiian imagery and language used in his posts.
¶ 10.]

[Id. at

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, on June 3, 2018, a

Facebook user named Chrystal Docker – who is not a part of this
action - posted a comment on the Danny the Doula Reviews tab,
then posted a subsequent reply to her initial comment, that
Plaintiff is from Hawai`i.

[Id. at ¶ 8, Exh. 1 at 2.]

7

Plaintiff maintains two Facebook business pages, titled
“Danny the Doula” and “Maternity in Motion,” to promote his
professional work as a doula and photographer/videographer.
[Gallagher Decl. at ¶ 5.]
14
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However, Plaintiff’s Maternity in Motion business page
does not expressly state Plaintiff’s primary place of business
is Hawai`i and instead shows Plaintiff’s described professional
goal is to “travel the world, telling the stories of our world’s
birthers and their journeys as creators of life.”

[Reply at 10-

11 (citing Gallagher Decl., Exh. 8 (screenshot of Maternity in
Motion “About” section)).]

While it is possible that

Plaintiff’s photographs containing waterfalls and other
landscape, could be recognized by some as being taken in
Hawai`i, it is apparent that these photographs are not
explicitly identified as having been taken there.
When combined with the lack of Hawai`i being expressly
mentioned on Plaintiff’s business page, the reasonable inference
is that nothing on Plaintiff’s business pages or his photography
work displayed of Facebook identifies Plaintiff as living or
working in Hawai`i.

Plaintiff is unable to meet his burden of

proof in demonstrating that Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and
Pavlovksy knew Plaintiff lived and operated his businesses in
Hawai`i, and directed their comments at the forum.

There is no

express statement that Plaintiff’s businesses are located in
Hawai`i on either of Plaintiff’s business pages, and Plaintiff’s
counsel was unable to identify any at the hearing.

Plaintiff’s

photographs, though labeled with “#Oahu,” “#Maui,” and “#Japan,”
in the information above some of the images, see Gallagher
15
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Decl., Exh. 2, appear to be posted only on Plaintiff’s Maternity
in Motion business page, not the Danny the Doula business page
where the allegedly defamatory comments appear to be directed;
and Plaintiff has not demonstrated either Hopaki, Byers,
Kirillov, or Pavlovksy accessed both business pages.

Further,

Plaintiff’s argument that Ms. Docker stated Plaintiff is “in
Hawaii” is unavailing.

Plaintiff explained the “Reviews tab

showed as many comments and replies as the site allowed to open
at one time in order to take an accurate view of all information
on the tab(s).”

[Gallagher Decl. at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).]

However, Plaintiff neither argued nor submitted other evidence
that Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, or Pavlovksy “opened” Ms. Docker’s
comment or reply in order to view it.

Nor does the Second

Amended Complaint plead any additional non-conclusory facts that
Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff was based in
Hawai`i.

For example, Plaintiff simply alleges “[a]ll

defendants . . . [were] fully aware that plaintiff lived in
Hawaii and that plaintiff was a professionally practicing doula
and photographer in the state of Hawaii.”
Complaint at ¶ 141.]

[Second Amended

Plaintiff fails to explain, however, how

and why Defendants should have known he was in Hawai`i - such as
an express statement on a Facebook page or prior interaction
with Plaintiff – in order to plausibly allege that Defendants
knew Plaintiff lived and worked in Hawai`i.
16
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief”. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Plaintiff has not met the first prong of the specific
jurisdiction test as to these defendants and, therefore, the
Court need not address the second or third prongs of the
specific jurisdiction test.

It concludes that it does not have

personal jurisdiction over Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and
Pavlovsky.

See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (“If the

plaintiff fails to satisfy either [the first or second] prongs,
personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.”).
Accordingly, the Motion is granted insofar as Plaintiff’s claims
are dismissed as to Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and Pavlovksy.
c.

Boulter

Boulter presents the only exception to the analysis
above.

Boulter commented on Plaintiff’s Danny the Doula

business page and received a direct reply from Ms. Docker that
Plaintiff was “in Hawaii.”

[Gallagher Decl., Exh. 1 at 1.]

Boulter also commented on the Reviews tabs on Plaintiff’s Danny
the Doula and Maternity in Motion business pages.
at 2.]

[Id., Exh. 2

Because Boulter was told where Plaintiff resides, and

viewed both the Danny the Doula and Maternity in Motion business
17
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pages that had photographs of Plaintiff’s business in Hawai`i,
it is reasonable to infer that Boulter knew Plaintiff lived and
worked in Hawai`i, and directed her comments at Plaintiff’s
business pages with the intent of injuring his business in the
forum.

Such was the case in Jason Scott Collection Inc. v.

Trendily Furniture LLC, No. CV. 17-02712-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL
6888514, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2017).

There, the plaintiff

brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona, alleging copyright infringement.

The

Arizona district court found that the nonresident defendant sold
allegedly infringing pieces of furniture in the same market as
Plaintiff, thereby “taking aim at Plaintiff’s copyrights and
undermining Plaintiff’s business,” and ruled that it had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Id. at *3.

Trendily

distinguished its ruling from Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277
(2014), and Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2015),
noting both cases involved interference with personal finances,
which affected the plaintiffs personally, regardless of their
state of residence.

Id.

The MaternityWise Defendants also cite

to Walden and Picot in support of their position.

However, the

Court finds the analysis in Trendily persuasive and applicable
to the situation at hand because Boulter knew Plaintiff resided
and worked in Hawai`i, and directed her allegedly defamatory
comments at the forum to undermine his Hawai`i business.
18
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Case 1:18-cv-00364-LEK-KJM Document 64 Filed 02/27/19 Page 19 of 31
664

PageID #:

the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test is met, as to
Boulter.
d.

Lund, Saldaya, Brown, Chidester,
Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell,
Gwizd, Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria

Because Lund and Saldaya only filed joinders of simple
agreement,8 and neither Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour,
Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, Leppard-Westhaver, nor Victoria have filed
any joinder in the Motion, the Court is not required to address
personal jurisdiction as to these defendants.

See Pakootas v.

Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Because a party can waive personal jurisdiction, [a court is]
not required to consider it sua sponte.”).

However, in the

interest of judicial economy, the Court finds that the foregoing
purposeful direction analysis applies equally to Lund, Saldaya,
Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd,
Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria because Plaintiff has neither
pled facts in the Second Amended Complaint nor presented
evidence in connection with the Motion to establish that these

8

This Court has previously explained that the Local Rules
distinguish between substantive joinders and joinders of simple
agreement, particularly with regard to the relief obtained by
the joining party. See Hyland v. Office of Hous. & Cmty. Dev.,
CIVIL 15-00504 LEK-RLP, 2018 WL 4119903, at *3 (D. Hawai`i
Aug. 29, 2018) (“A party filing a substantive joinder may
‘seek[] the same relief sought by the movant for himself,
herself, or itself,’ whereas a joinder of simple agreement
‘simply seek[s] relief for the original movant.’” (alterations
in Hyland) (quoting Local Rule LR7.9)).
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defendants were aware Plaintiff lived and worked in Hawai`i.
Thus, Plaintiff has not established the first prong of the
specific jurisdiction test as to those defendants.

There is,

therefore, no personal jurisdiction over Lund, Saldaya, Brown,
Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, LeppardWesthaver, and Victoria, and Plaintiff’s claims against those
defendants are dismissed as well.
2.

Defendant’s Forum Related Activities

Because Plaintiff alleges his injuries arise out of
MaternityWise’s and Croudace’s business in Hawai`i, i.e., the
doula certification program, the second prong of the specific
jurisdiction test is also met.

As to Boulter, Plaintiff’s

alleged injuries necessarily arise from Boulter’s intentional
interaction with the forum, i.e., posting comments on
Plaintiff’s Facebook business pages that Boulter knew or should
have known were based in Hawai`i.

Thus, the second prong of the

specific jurisdiction test is met as to Boulter as well.
3.

Reasonableness of Exercise of Jurisdiction

Because Plaintiff has established the first two prongs
of the specific jurisdiction test as to MaternityWise, Croudace,
and Boulter (“Remaining Defendants”), the burden shifts to them
to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be
reasonable.

See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.

previously stated:
20
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In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction
is reasonable so as to comport with fair play and
substantial justice, courts must consider the
following factors:
(1) the extent of the defendants’
purposeful interjection into the forum
state’s affairs;
(2) the burden on the defendant of
defending in the forum;
(3) the extent of conflict with the
sovereignty of the defendants’ state;
(4) the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute;
(5) the most efficient judicial
resolution of the controversy;
(6) the importance of the forum to the
plaintiff’s interest in convenient and
effective relief; and
(7) the existence of an alternative
forum.
Fiore [v. Walden], 688 F.3d [558, 583–84
(9th Cir. 2011)]. The Court balances all
seven factors, recognizing that none of the
factors is dispositive in itself. Id.
[Trade W., Inc. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., Civ.
No. 12–00606 ACK–BMK, 2013 WL 1856302, at *7 (D.
Hawaii Apr. 30, 2013)].
Barranco, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1082 (alterations in Barranco).
Here, the Remaining Defendants argue generally that the exercise
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable because they have not
purposefully or expressly targeted Hawai`i, and the burden of

21
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defending this action in the forum would be extremely great.
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 13.]
a.

Purposeful Interjection

This Court previously stated:
“The Ninth Circuit has recognized that
‘circumstances may exist where the level of
purposeful injection into the forum supports a
finding of purposeful availment yet still weighs
against the reasonableness of jurisdiction.’”
[Trade West, 2013 WL 1856302, at *7] (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fiore, 688 F.3d
at 583). “‘The smaller the element of purposeful
interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be
anticipated and the less reasonable its
exercise.’” Id. (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.
1981)).
Barranco, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1082.

MaternityWise and Croudace

have purposefully interjected themselves into the forum by
advertising and doing business in Hawai`i, therefore, this
factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

As to Boulter, because her

interjection arose merely from her comments on Plaintiff’s
Facebook pages, the Court finds the level of Boulter’s
purposeful interjection into Hawai`i is slight, and this factor
weighs in favor of Boulter.
b.

Burden on the Defendant

The Remaining Defendants argue the burden of defending
in the forum is great where all of the Defendants are located
thousands of miles from Hawai`i.

The Ninth Circuit has

cautioned that, “unless the inconvenience is so great as to
22
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constitute a deprivation of due process, it will not overcome
clear justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Panavision Int’l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir.
1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, this district court has recognized that advancements in
communication and transportation have reduced the overall
inconvenience of defending in another forum.

See Kukui Gardens

Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1116
(D. Hawai`i 2008) (citations omitted).

This factor therefore

weighs in favor of Plaintiff.
c.

Conflict with State Sovereignty

The Remaining Defendants have not addressed whether
proceeding in the forum would conflict with the sovereignty of
any of the states in which they reside.

Plaintiff asserts no

conflict exists because it is “Plaintiff’s reputation and
business in Hawaii that was destroyed and must be protected.”
[Mem. in Opp. at 20.]

Even if the Remaining Defendants had

presented any argument, the “sovereignty of a defendant’s state
is not a significant consideration in actions between citizens
of the United States.”

Kukui Gardens, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1116

(citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d
834, 841 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Accordingly, this factor weighs in

favor of Plaintiff.
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Interest of Hawai`i

“Hawaii has a strong interest in providing an
effective means of redress for its residents who
are tortiously injured.” Resnick [v. Rowe], 283
F. Supp. 2d [1128,] 1141 [(D. Hawai`i 2003)]
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A state generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in
providing its residents with a convenient forum
for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state
actors.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473, 105 S.
Ct. 2174.
Barranco, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1083.

Since Plaintiff is a resident

of Hawai`i, this factor weighs in his favor.
e.

Efficiency

This factor “‘focuses on the location of the evidence
and witnesses[,]’ and is ‘no longer weighed heavily given the
modern advances in communication and transportation.’”

Id.

(other citation omitted) (citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323).
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the evidence of the harm
suffered by him is in Hawai`i, and all other evidence is
accessible online.

However, since neither of the Remaining

Defendants reside in Hawai`i and any travel will be costly,
there will be some additional expense in bringing in witnesses.
On balance, the Court finds this factor is neutral.
f.

Convenient and Effective
Relief for Plaintiff

Hawai`i is the more convenient forum for Plaintiff
because he currently lives in Hawai`i.

Plaintiff asserts his

business is primarily in Hawai`i, and litigating in alternative
24
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forums, as the Remaining Defendants suggest, would be unduly
burdensome because it would result in “twenty or so” separate
proceedings and would offend judicial economy and efficiency.
[Mem. in Opp. at 21.]

However, in evaluating this factor,

“little weight is given to the plaintiff’s inconvenience.”
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324 (citation omitted).

Additionally,

the acts of each defendant in this case were discreet, could be
judged individually, and therefore need not be tried together.
See Terracom v. Valley Nat.l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir.
1995).

Because Plaintiff’s inconvenience is given little

weight, this factor weighs in favor of the Remaining Defendants.
g.

Existence of an Alternative Forum

Here, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating no
alternative forum is available.
1324.

See Panavision, 141 F.3d at

The parties agree that alternative forums exist, although

Plaintiff argues filing in the forum of each defendant would be
unduly burdensome and against judicial economy.

Still, because

Plaintiff has not met his burden in demonstrating Hawai`i is the
only forum available, this factor weighs in favor of the
Remaining Defendants.
h.

Summary of the Seven Factors

The second, third, and fourth factors weigh in favor
of jurisdiction in the forum, and the first factor partially
weighs in Plaintiff’s favor insofar as it pertains to
25
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The sixth and seventh factors weigh

in favor of the Remaining Defendants, and the first factor as to
Boulter weighs only slightly against jurisdiction.
factor is neutral.

The fifth

The factors are nearly evenly split, if not

slightly more in favor of Plaintiff.

However, because the

Remaining Defendants must present a “compelling case” against
reasonableness, the third prong of the specific jurisdiction
test is met.

See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).
In sum, all three prongs of the specific jurisdiction
test have been met, and it is appropriate to exercise personal
jurisdiction over MaternityWise, Croudace, and Boulter.
C.

Leave to Amend
Insofar as this Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims

against Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, Pavlovksy, Lund, Saldaya,
Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd,
Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria, the dismissal is without
prejudice because it is possible that Plaintiff could amend his
complaint to cure the deficiencies identified herein.

See

Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d
1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013) (“As a general rule, dismissal
without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de
novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any
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amendment.” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
II.

Venue
The Remaining Defendants assert venue is improper here

because the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any of the
events occurred in the forum, and all of the evidence and
witnesses are not in Hawai`i.

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391, which states in pertinent part:
(b) Venue in general. - A civil action may be
brought in (1) a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district
is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an
action may otherwise be brought as provided
in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action.
Here, section (b)(1) does not apply because all of the
Remaining Defendants are not residents of a single state.
However, section (b)(2) is applicable because the claims against
the Remaining Defendants, appear to arise primarily out of
Plaintiff’s doula certification through MaternityWise, which
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took place in Hawai`i, and Plaintiff alleges he suffered harm in
Hawai`i.

See Miracle v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d

1060, 1072-73 (D. Hawai`i 2000) (ruling that venue in Hawai`i
for a defamation action against nonresident defendants was
proper where “the harm [plaintiff] experienced as a result of
the article occurred in Hawaii”).

Therefore, venue is

appropriate in Hawai`i.
Nonetheless, the Remaining Defendants assert this
Court has the discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The

Ninth Circuit has stated the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
“an exceptional tool to be employed sparingly, [not a] . . .
doctrine that compels plaintiffs to choose the optimal forum for
their claim.”

Dole, 303 F.3d at 1118 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (alterations in Dole).

The moving

party bears the burden of demonstrating that: (1) an adequate
alternative forum exists; and (2) the balance of private and
public interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

Lueck v.

Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2001).
In the instant matter, the Remaining Defendants
suggest Plaintiff should file “separate actions where
jurisdiction is appropriate, and if warranted, mov[e] to
consolidate those actions through the mechanisms and procedures
available.”

[Reply at 6.]

The Remaining Defendants largely
28
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rely on their position that personal jurisdiction does not
exist, and have not presented any other persuasive arguments
detailing how either the private or public factors should be
considered.

Because the Remaining Defendants have only

addressed the first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis,
they have failed to meet their burden in persuading this Court
that dismissal based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
warranted under these circumstances.

The Court therefore denies

the Motion as to the MaternityWise Defendants’ arguments
regarding venue.
III. Improper Service
Finally, the Remaining Defendants argue Plaintiff has
failed to properly serve the Second Amended Complaint, which is
the operative complaint in this case.

Because the Court has

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Hocker, Byers, Kirillov,
and Pavlovsky, the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT as to those
defendants.9

However, since the Court has determined personal

jurisdiction exists as to MaternityWise, Croudace, and Boulter,
the Court reserves ruling on this issue and DIRECTS the parties
to meet and confer regarding accepting service of the operative

9

The Court declines to address this issue as to Lund,
Saldaya, Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell,
Gwizd, Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria since the Court has ruled
that it does not have personal jurisdiction over these
defendants.
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If Plaintiff files a third amended complaint and

service of process issues arise, the Court DIRECTS the parties
to meet and confer before submitting the issues to the
magistrate judge.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the MaternityWise
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, filed
December 14, 2018, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
The Motion is GRANTED insofar as the Court concludes it does not
have personal jurisdiction over Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and
Pavlovsky, and all claims against those defendants are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; the remainder of the Motion as to those
defendants is DENIED AS MOOT.

The Motion is DENIED as to

MaternityWise, Croudace, and Boulter with regard to personal
jurisdiction and venue, and the Court RESERVES RULING on the
portion of the Motion concerning service.

The Joinders are also

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART because the Joinders merely
support the relief sought by the MaternityWise Defendants.
However, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Lund, Saldaya, Brown,
Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, LeppardWesthaver, and Victoria are HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
based on the Court’s conclusion that it does not have personal
jurisdiction over these defendants.
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To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims have been
dismissed without prejudice, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave
to file a third amended complaint consistent with the terms of
this Order.

Plaintiff must file his third amended complaint by

no later than April 29, 2019.

This Court CAUTIONS Plaintiff

that, if he fails to file his third amended complaint by
April 29, 2019, the claims which this Order dismissed without
prejudice may be dismissed with prejudice.

Further, if

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint fails to cure the defects
identified in this Order, this Court may dismiss those claims
with prejudice.

If Plaintiff’s third amended complaint attempts

to add new parties, claims, or theories of liability, this Court
may dismiss those claims, but without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAI`I, February 27, 2019.

DANNY GALLAGHER VS. MATERNITYWISE INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ET AL.; CV
18-00364 LEK-KJM; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART:
1) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL; 2) DEFENDANT
LUND’S JOINDER; AND 3) DEFENDANT SALDAYA’S JOINDER
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